# Model-specific risks and mitigation mechanisms

RUBT risks arise not from “token volatility” but from the architecture: localized settlement in rubles via a partner perimeter combined with ERC-20 on-chain circulation. Below are risks specific to this design and the embedded mitigations.

#### 9.1. Risk of divergence between “on-chain ↔ settlement perimeter” accounting

Nature of risk: potential mismatch between

* on-chain RUBT balances on users’ Managed Wallets, and
* records/accounting of the Digital Right in the Execution Platform perimeter.

Mitigations:

* Managed Wallets (EIP-4337) and dual signature (user + Execution Platform technical authorization for actions affecting the Monetary Claim);
* Mirror Invariants: no operation in the settlement perimeter without a mirrored on-chain transaction, and vice versa;
* smart contracts and Execution Platform integration hard-code two invariants:
* no Execution Platform record without an equal on-chain balance on the Managed Wallet;
* no withdrawal into free on-chain circulation without termination/adjustment of the Claim in the settlement perimeter.

Core idea: risk is eliminated by architecture and invariants, not by “procedures.”

#### 9.2. Risk of insufficient RUB Reserves (≥1:1)

Nature of risk: total Reserves of the Settlement Agent fall below total outstanding Monetary Claims under RUBT in the settlement perimeter.

Mitigations:

* contractual duty of the Settlement Agent to maintain Reserves ≥1:1 versus outstanding Claims;
* three-layer reserve structure (L1–L3) optimized for T+0/T+1 liquidity;
* exclusion of RUBT on the Settlement Agent’s managed wallet from coverage calculations to avoid overstating liabilities;
* Proof-of-Reserves and reporting to the DAO and partner Execution Platforms;
* strict localization of buyback and Claim creation: the Claim exists and is settled only in rubles and only within the settlement perimeter, preventing uncontrolled external Claims “anywhere and in any currency.”

#### 9.3. Risk of Execution Platform unavailability or failure

Nature of risk: the Execution Platform is required for:

* Settlement Agent execution of placing/buyback operations;
* buyback 1 RUBT = 1 RUB in rubles;
* maintaining Mirror Invariants.

Prolonged unavailability of an Execution Platform temporarily deprives users of operations related to Claim settlement via the Settlement Agent, while on-chain RUBT balances on Managed Wallets remain.

Mitigations:

* settlement occurs only within the perimeter, making the risk observable and manageable: failure suspends Claim-perimeter operations rather than “breaking” the model;
* during downtime users continue to hold RUBT on-chain but cannot create/modify the Claim without synchronization;
* after recovery, mirror architecture enables correct continuation of accounting;
* strategic reduction through diversification across multiple partner Execution Platforms (architecture supports multiple platforms if invariants are preserved).

#### 9.4. Risk of Settlement Agent incapacity or failure

Nature of risk: the Settlement Agent concentrates:

* settlement execution role in the perimeter;
* custody of L1–L3 Reserves;
* buyback operator/market-making functions;
* protocol roles (Minter/Burner).

Incapacity (insolvency, account blocking, license loss, external restrictions) may temporarily make settlement of Claims impossible.

Mitigations:

* use of nominal/specialized accounts to separate client funds and Agent funds (within the applicable counterparty regime);
* ability to pause mint/burn and buyback at the protocol-role level;
* replacement of the Settlement Agent by DAO decision with procedural alignment in the settlement perimeter;
* architectural ability to substitute the Settlement Agent with a new obligated entity that assumes RUB obligations and Reserves while preserving accounting invariants.

#### 9.5. Market risk of the DAO treasury position (long BTC/ETH, short RUB)

Nature of risk: the DAO intentionally holds a structural position: long BTC/ETH versus RUBT obligations. Adverse BTC/ETH performance can reduce treasury value.

Mitigations:

* conservative leverage and debt limits;
* asset diversification and cautious DeFi usage;
* Governance control by veTETRIS holders over treasury policy.

#### 9.6. External constraints and geopolitics

Nature of risk: even with correct architecture, external constraints may affect operations, settlements, and counterparty availability.

Risk-reducing factors:

* collateral is held in rubles in the country of incorporation of the Execution Platform (banks/brokers/liquid instruments);
* the Issuer/Agent structure is designed to minimize dependence on higher-risk jurisdictions and infrastructures;
* disputes and settlement are localized within the settlement perimeter.

This risk cannot be fully eliminated: operational frictions, restrictions, and indirect impacts remain possible.